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Postmodern thought is increasingly displacing Modernism as the prevalent
worldview, which is having a profound affect on America's legal institutions. It is
unrealistic to expect that present day interpretation of the Constitution, a
document written in an era under the sway of Modernity-which is antithetical
to Postmodernity-would not result in extreme instances of dissonance,
inconsistency, and near incomprehensibility. Accordingly, it is becoming
increasingly necessary, and even urgent, to critically assess the implications of
the changes inherent in the general societal shift to Postmodern thought to
ensure that a coherent and functional system of law will result. Nowhere is the
tension between these competing worldviews more apparent than in religion
clause jurisprudence as the two philosophies are diametrically opposed in their
understanding of the role and source of religion. This Note uses Cutter v.
Wilkinson, a Sixth Circuit Case pending review by the United States Supreme
Court, to illustrate the disarray into which First Amendment religion
jurisprudence will fall, or has already fallen, as a result of Postmodern thought
controlling interpretation of the decidedly Modern religion clauses. Specifically,
Postmodern assumptions regarding religion are incompatible with the
underlying justification for the religion clauses and application of these
assumptions have resulted a marked weakening offree exercise guarantees. The
Cutter case represents an important opportunity for the Court to address these
issues and hopefully restore coherency and functionality to religion clauses
jurisprudence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Oh God said to Abraham, "Kill me a son"
Abe says, "Man, you must beputtin 'me on"
Godsay, "No. "Abe say, "What?"
God say, "You can do what you want Abe, but
The next time you see me comin 'you better run"
Well Abe says, "Where do you want this killin 'done?"
God says, "Out on Highway 61. "
Well Mack the Finger said to Louie the King
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I got forty red white and blue shoe strings
And a thousand telephones that don't ring
Do you know where I can get rid of these things
And Louie the King said let me think for a minute son
And he said yes I think it can be easily done
Just take everything down to Highway 61.
-Bob Dylan, Highway 61 Revisited1
While the lyrics to Bob Dylan's 1965 song Highway 61 Revisited might at
first blush appear to be utter nonsense, a thoughtful examination reveals Dylan
articulating his vision of a Postmodem world, accentuating the profound impact
of Postmodemism on thoughts of religion. Dylan portrays a world where
competing ideas and conceptions of ultimate truth were all equal. By juxtaposing
the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham, 2 a foundational event for the three major
Western faiths, with a used shoe string salesman hawking useless junk at a
roadside flea market, Dylan's Highway 61 Revisited was a symbol of religion in
the Postmodem world, the place where the transcendent and the mundane are
understood as non-distinct.3 In contrast, the philosophically Modem worldview
would have universally and unhesitatingly understood Abraham's sacrifice to be
far more significant than the need to unload some slightly used shoestrings. In the
four decades since Highway 61 Revisited was released, Postmodemism has
ascended from artistic experimentation by the avant-garde to a position as the
increasingly dominant philosophy of our day, redefining our society's collective
way of thinking and challenging institutions that have been built upon Modem
intellectual foundations.4 While penetrating every aspect of our culture in general,
I BOB DYLAN, Highway 61 Revisited, on HIGHWAY 61 REviSrrED (Columbia Records
1965). Complete lyrics available at http://www.bobdylan.com/songs/highway6l.html (last
visited Sept. 22, 2004).
2 See Genesis 22:1-18.
3 Highway 61 is an American highway that runs from New Orleans, through Memphis, all
the way to Dylan's home state of Minnesota; all places that played a unique and vital role in
America's musical heritage (crediting Minnesota with Dylan's success), each with a distinct
sound. Dylan's Highway 61 Revisited sought to blur the line of demarcation between different
styles of music, evidenced by his focus on the road that joined these places instead of the places
themselves. As confirmation that such a view is not just gross over interpretation, Highway 61
Revisited was recorded over the same summer that Dylan stunned the music world by playing
an electric guitar at the Newport Folk Festival. The folk music purists who reveled in the
festival received the act with revulsion as the electric guitar was considered a rock instrument,
and rock an inferior style of music. Dylan, at the time, was the darling of the folk music world,
its newest and brightest star, and the action was calculated to obtain just such a response.
Shattering these musical distinctions, equalizing supposedly higher and lower art forms, was
just one indication that Postmodemism was on Dylan's mind when he wrote Highway 61
Revisited.
4 1 am indebted to HUBERT L. DREYFUS, who in his KIERKEGAARD ON THE INFORMATION
HIGHWAY (2000), available at http://www.ieor.berkeley.edu/--goldberg/lecs/lierkegaard.html,
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as it applies to the law, the shift from Modernism to Postmodemism has created a
state of unrest in judicial treatment of the Religion Clauses, which are premised,
as much as any other constitutional provisions, upon Modem ideals.
As America entered the Twenty-First Century, the Postmodem ideas on
religion represented in Highway 61 Revisited were displacing widely held beliefs
associated with the worldview of Modernism, particularly the proper societal role
and treatment of religion. Rather than being limited to an artistic or religious
phenomenon, the emergence of Postmodem thought has already affected
American legal institutions and laws, and will continue to become increasingly
influential. It is unrealistic to expect that present day interpretations of the
Constitution, a document written in an era under the sway of Modemity-which
as a general societal philosophy is antithetical to Postmodemity-would not result
in extreme instances of dissonance, inconsistency, and near incomprehensibility.
Perhaps the unarticulated assumptions about the influence of Postmodem thought
that the current Supreme Court justices employ in their role as interpreters are
responsible for some of the deep divisions in controversial cases and make it
seem, at times, as though the justices argue around each other, each seeming to
ignore or fail to comprehend the other. Accordingly, it is becoming increasingly
necessary, and even urgent, to critically assess the implications of the changes
brought by a general societal shift to Postmodem thought to ensure that a coherent
and functional system of law will result.
As Postmodemism is a reaction to and a rejection of Modernity, there are
times when Postmodern judicial interpretation will be inconsistent with
provisions of the Constitution that are most uniquely a product of Modernity,
possibly rendering constitutional jurisprudence dysfunctional. Such dysfunction is
particularly acute in the treatment of the Religion Clauses, because the two
philosophies are diametrically opposed in their understanding of the role and
source of religion. The goal of this Note is to identify where the two systems clash
and how their incompatible views on religion have adversely affected religion
clause jurisprudence. I will examine this issue by making a case study of Cutter v.
Wilkinson,5 a Sixth Circuit case that relies heavily on Postmodem philosophical
principles to guide its analysis of whether the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), a law promoting the free exercise of
religion, violates the Establishment Clause. The case is richly illustrative of the
difference between Modem and Postmodern assumptions surrounding the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, and it is extremely useful for making sense of the
disarray into which religion clause jurisprudence has plunged as a result of the
competition between the two worldviews. By analyzing Cutter and other
made me consider Dylan and Highway 61 Revisited at greater depths. I think however, that it is
more appropriate to view Highway 61 Revisited as Postmodern rather than nihilistic, as Dreyfus
interprets it.
5 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003).
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important influences on the Religion Clauses in light of the shift from Modernity
to Postmodemism, this Note will illuminate why the treatment of religious legal
issues is increasingly incoherent and how a coherent framework can be
reestablished within the Postmodern Age by focusing on and crediting the
original Modem justifications for the Religion Clauses.
Part II of this Note gives a brief history of the major shifts in the treatment of
the Free Exercise Clause and how Congress came to protect the Free Exercise
Clause in place of the Court, ultimately giving rise to religious accommodation
acts such as RLUIPA.
Part I1l presents an explanation of the principles of Modernity and how they
were essential to the creation of the Constitution, providing the intellectual
foundation and justification for the Religion Clauses. Part III also discusses the
emergence of Postmodem philosophy as a reaction to Modernity, focusing
specifically on its treatment of religion and identifying ideals and values that are
distinctly Postmodem.
Part IV analyzes the Sixth Circuit's treatment of RLUIPA specifically and
religion generally in the Cutter case as an example of Postmodem judicial
philosophy, focusing on its inconsistencies with the Modem justifications for the
Religion Clauses.
Part V presents suggestions on how to restore coherency to religion clause
jurisprudence in the Postmodern age, namely by recognizing and keeping
religious belief uniquely worthy of protection, eliminating the absolute neutrality
requirement from Establishment Clause cases, and invoking Equal Protection
principles in religion cases.
II. THE SHIFT IN FREE EXERCISE PRiNCIPLES AND THE HISTORY OF
RLUIPA
A. Shifting Constitutional Standards: Smith, Laws of General
Applicability, and the Failure of Court Mandated Exemptions to Protect
Free Exercise
RLUIPA was enacted as part of a continuing attempt by the U.S. Congress to
restore the protection accorded religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment of the Constitution 6 to the standard used before the
landmark Employment Division v. Smith decision in 1990.7 The Smith Court
required only reasonable basis review in First Amendment Free Exercise
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.").
7 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith is sometimes referred to as the
"Peyote Case."
1024 [Vol. 65: 1021
POSTMODERN RELIGION CLA USES JURISPRUDENCE
challenges to laws of general applicability.8 By moving away from strict scrutiny
review, the decision lowered the protection given under the Free Exercise Clause
to groups seeking exemptions to laws that incidentally curbed their religious
practices.9 Smith was a watershed case and Congress, perceiving it as a
cheapening of constitutional protections of fundamental liberties, has attempted to
restore legislatively the higher level of scrutiny rejected by the Court.' 0
The respondents in Smith were fired from their private sector jobs at a drug
rehabilitation center after they were discovered to have ingested peyote, an
unlawful controlled substance under Oregon state law.'1 As members of the
Native American Church, the respondents had used peyote ceremonially as a
sacrament in keeping with the tenets of their faith.12 After being terminated by
their private employer, the respondents were also denied unemployment
compensation by the state as they had been fired for "misconduct," making them
ineligible for benefits. 13 The state's denial of unemployment benefits was
challenged as a state action, which violated their First Amendment Free Exercise
rights. 14
The Court asserted that the First Amendment guarantees chiefly the "right to
believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires."' s While the First
Amendment prevents a state from making laws directly aimed at a specific
religion, laws that are generally applicable to all people and only curb religious
exercise as an incidental effect are permissible so long as a reasonable
8 See id. at 884-85 (refusing to employ balancing test from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963), which requires the government to have a compelling interest to justify a law that
substantially burdens religious practice).
9 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-111, at 7 (1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897
('he effect of the Smith decision has been to hold laws of general applicability that operate to
burden religious practices to the lowest level of scrutiny employed by the courts: the 'rational
relationship test."').
10 See, e.g., Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Religious Liberty at Home and Abroad: Reflections
on Protecting this Fundamental Freedom, Keynote Address: International Law and Religions
Symposium (Oct. 6, 2000), in 2001 BYU L. REv. 413, 424-26 (2001) (explaining that the
Court's abandonment of strict scrutiny in free exercise claims was the impetus for trying to
restore it legislatively).
I I See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
12 Id. The Native American Church has been defined as including "some 100,000
adherents from over 50 North American Indian tribes.. .loosely unified through
sacramental ingestion of the non-narcotic hallucinogenic buds of the peyote plant ... in
Saturday all-night rites ..... " THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF RELIGIONS (John R. Hinnells
ed. 1984).
13 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
14 See id.
15 Id at 877.
2004] 1025
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
justification for the law exists. 16 The Smith Court identified Sherbert as the origin
for the strict scrutiny standard in free exercise claims,17 but limited the application
of that standard to instances where the unemployment laws themselves burdened
free exercise. 18 Specifically, the Court rejected the need for the government to
demonstrate a compelling interest to justify the incidental burden placed on free
exercise of religion created by laws of general applicability, especially in the
context of criminal laws. 19 Only when the Free Exercise Clause worked in
conjunction with another fundamental right, such as Equal Protection or Free
Speech, did the Court indicate it would be willing to consider a religious
exemption to reasonable and neutral general laws.20
While critics denounced Smith as a dramatic departure from the precedent
established for reviewing free exercise claims under Sherbert and its progeny, 21
the Court insisted that it was following the traditional manner in which these
matters were usually dealt, with Sherbert being an unusual exception. 22 As an
16 Id. at 877-78.
17 Id. at 883 (establishing the requirement that state actions "that substantially burden a
religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest") (citing Sherbert,
374 U.S. at 402-03).
18 See id at 882-84. While the respondents in Smith were denied unemployment benefits
by the state, the burden on their free exercise rights came from criminal laws. Id. at 884-85.
Contrast with Sherbert, where the claimant was denied unemployment benefits because she
refused to work on Saturday in accordance with the practice of her faith. 374 U.S. at 399-400.
19 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85. "To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law
contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's
interest is 'compelling'--permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto
himself,'-contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense." Id. at 885 (quoting
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)).
20 Id. at 881. Mark Tushnet identifies the Court's willingness to consider an exemption
from general laws where two fundamental rights are implicated as the hybrid exception. He is
suspicious that, as applied, this idea would not create a religious exception to a generally
applicable law, but rather invalidate a law as unconstitutional for violating one of the other
rights implicated. See Mark V. Tushnet, Questioning the Value ofAccommodating Religion, in
LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 245,246 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000).
21 See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 10, at 424-25.
22 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79. The Court based its reliance for this proposition on two
cases, both of which are arguably misused by the Smith Court. Id. at 879. The first case,
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, dealt with an individual's refusal to salute a flag as an act
of conscientious objection, and although involving a religious adherent, the act was not
considered religiously motivated as a matter of law. 310 U.S. 586, 597-98 (1940). Therefore,
the Free Exercise Clause was not considered implicated by that Court. The other case, Reynolds
v. United States, involved the practice of polygamy among Mormons. 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1879)
Arguably, state refusal to accommodate polygamy could be justified by a compelling interest of
the state, particularly in 1879. The Reynolds case raises the unique problem of refusing to
accommodate religion, if, as Tushnet argues, the refusal of the state to accommodate polygamy
contributed dramatically to the doctrinal shift of the Latter Day Saints Church to reject
1026 [Vol. 65: 1021
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alternative to "courting anarchy" 23 by requiring religious exemptions to general
laws through constitutional guarantees, the Smith Court suggested that the First
Amendment "value" of free exercise should be pursued through legislative
efforts. 24 Acknowledging the disadvantaged position that minority and fringe
religions would find themselves under such a scheme, the Court still insisted it
was a better alternative to making the balancing of religious beliefs against
societal interests commonplace in courts across the country.25
1. Objections to Smith
Many religious communities throughout the United States were troubled by
the majority decision in Smith.26 The fear that the decision made religious
polygamy. See, Tushnet, supra note 20, at 250. Perhaps the state's influence on religion is
justifiable if society has a compelling interest to encourage such a change (e.g., eliminating
virgin sacrifice), but for the state to proscribe orthodoxy by proxy in matters great and small
without a compelling interest would surely violate principles of separation inherent in the
Religion Clauses.
23 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
24 See id at 890 (suggesting that protected values in the Bill of Rights can be promoted by
legislation in the political process).
Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the press by the First
Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed
word, so also a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief
can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well.
Id.
25 See id. It has been suggested that religious exemption claims are brought primarily by
minority religions because the system naturally protects mainstream religious practices. See
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 128 (First Anchor Books Edition 1994)
(1993) (.'[N]ot a single religious exemption claim has ever reached the Supreme Court from a
mainstream Christian religious practitioner."') (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and
Liberal Democaracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 216 (1992)); see also, e.g., Joseph R. Duncan, Jr.,
Privilege, Invisibility, and Religion: A Critique of the Privilege that Christianity Has Enjoyed in
the United States, 54 ALA. L. REv. 617, 620-21, 625-26 (2003). One of the principal sponsors
of legislative efforts to restore strict scrutiny to religious exercise claims invokes the need to
protect minority religions from potentially oppressive majoritarian rule. See Hatch, supra note
10, at 424 (noting the inconsistency between punishing members of the Native American
Church for ingestion of peyote, yet not prosecuting Christian churches that provide wine to
minors in sacramental ceremonies).
For a challenge to the hypothesis that the "Rehnquist Court's doctrinal innovations will
turn subsequent Religion Clause cases against minorities in an unprecedented fashion," see
Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History, the
Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 223 (2003).
26 See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 10, at 425 (stating, perhaps understating, that the
"abandonment of the strict scrutiny standard resulted in dismay among the religious
community."); see also, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892,
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freedoms subservient to the whims of majoritarian bodies is understandable,
especially if one accepts Stephen L. Carter's description of Smith as valid; "The
majority scoffed at [their] claim, not so much disbelieving it as disregarding it: the
fact that the peyote use had religious significance, the Court said, was irrelevant,
as long as the state law was not 'an attempt to regulate religious [belief
directly]."' 27
The remaining members of the Court were likewise dismayed by the shift in
religion clause jurisprudence, as expressed in Justice O'Connor's concurrence,
which stated that "[the] holding dramatically departs from well-settled First
Amendment jurisprudence, appears unnecessary to resolve the question
presented, and is incompatible with our Nation's fundamental commitment to
individual religious liberty. '28 O'Connor rejected the majority's distinction
between laws that directly target religion and generally applicable law with only
incidental effect on religion, because it allowed the state to do indirectly what it
was forbidden to do directly, essentially nullifying the freedom of religion as
promised in the First Amendment.29 By reducing constitutional protection of free
exercise rights against generally applicable laws, religious individuals and groups
were forced by the Court to seek protection from the benevolence of; a
legislature.30 With the legislature serving functionally as a court of last resort it
1897 (reporting that at a committee hearing representatives of the religious community claimed,
"[s]ince Smith was decided, governments throughout the U.S. have run roughshod over
religious conviction").
27 CARTER, supra note 25, at 126 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 882).
28 Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29 Id. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (expressing that most burdens placed on religion
are from generally applicable laws, and "[ilf the First Amendment is to have any vitality, it
ought not be construed to cover only the extreme and hypothetical situation in which a State
directly targets a religious practice").
30 See CARTER, supra note 25, at 129 (critiquing the Court's suggestion that religious
accommodation is best worked out through the political process which they concede will
disfavor religious minorities: "What Justice Scalia misses is that it was in order to avoid this
'unavoidable consequence of democratic government' that the Free Exercise Clause was
crafted in the first place."). This critique echoes the majority in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which most artfully expressed the need to keep
fundamental rights above politics fifty years before Smith:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly,
and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of
no elections.
Id at 638 (emphasis added). Ironically, the Free Exercise Clause places the greatest restriction
on the legislature of all the government branches, requiring that Congress not pass any laws
prohibiting the free exercise of religion. See U.S. CONST. amend I.
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was argued, "some religious groups will likely be crushed by the weight of
majoritarian law and culture" or be pushed to radicalization. 31
2. Scrutiny for Free Exercise Claims of Free Citizens Changed by Smith
to the Same Standard Usedfor Inmates
The ironic and embarrassing truth is that Smith made applicable to society at
large the same standard used to assess free exercise claims of the men and women
in America's correctional facilities. Prior to Smith, the Court also rejected strict
scrutiny in free exercise claims regarding inmates in OLone v. Estate of
Shabazz.32 The dispute in O'Lone concerned Muslim inmates who wished to
observe the Jumu'ah, a weekly congregational service on Fridays after the sun has
peaked but before afternoon prayers as mandated by the Koran.33 Muslim
inmates on work detail outside of the prison grounds, who wanted to observe the
Jumu'ah, created a logistical problem for prison officials. To bring even one
Muslim prisoner back to the prison to attend Jumu'ah would require bringing all
prisoners on outside detail back to the prison for safety reasons as required under
prison regulations.34
The Court rejected strict scrutiny review of government action in free
exercise claims in prisons and denied the inmate's First Amendment claims,
reasoning that the religious practices of inmates could be burdened by prison rules
so long as the rules were "reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests." 35 The alternatives of assigning Muslim inmates to inside work duty on
Friday, or implementing alternative outside work days were both rejected as
being either too difficult to administer or too burdensome on already scarce
resources.36 Smith subjected free citizens to the same lower level of review for
free exercise claims as incarcerated individuals, effortlessly bridging the chasm
between legitimate penological interests and legitimate societal interests.
31 CARTER, supra note 25, at 129 (arguing that the minimalization of fringe religions can
cause radicalization) (quoting Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78
VA. L. REv. 671,690 (1992)).
32 482 U.S. 342, 350-52 (1987) (applying the four factor rational relationship test to
prison regulations that burdened a prisoner's fundamental fights from Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 89-90 (1987); 1) assessing the rational relationship between the regulation and the
governmental interest, 2) alternative means for prisoner to exercise right, 3) the impact of
accommodation, and 4) existence of alternatives to the regulation).
33 O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 345.
3 4 1d. at 346.
35 Id. at 349-51.
36 Id. at 346-47.
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B. Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Boerne
In 1993, Congress purportedly acted on the admonition of the Smith Court
and attempted to restore strict scrutiny for all governmental action in free exercise
claims by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).37 The
legislative record indicates that RFRA was motivated by the fact that "facially
neutral laws that operated to burden the free exercise of religion were often
upheld by the courts," under the Smith rationale and this "severely undermined
religious observance by many Americans. '3 8 It is true that the Smith Court
endorsed seeking accommodation through legislative bodies, however that
suggestion implied it would be done on a case-by-case basis rather than an across
the board legislative preference for accommodation. 39 RFRA expanded free
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (1993) (requiring that all governmental actions incidentally
burdening religious exercise must be justified by a compelling governmental interest, and be the
least restrictive means of achieving that interest). It is illustrative of the robust appreciation for
religious liberties in this country that the legislature gave wholesale protection to religious
exercise, protecting minority religions and not just politically or historically powerful religious
interests. That the Act had fifty-seven cosponsors in the hundred member Senate is also telling
of the commitment to religious liberty, or the extent of the fallout from the Smith decision. See
S. REP. No. 103-111, at 2 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1893.
38 S. REP. No. 103-111, at 5, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1894 (citing
testimony from Prof Douglas Laycock).
39 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (offering state laws in Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado,
which specifically exempted religiously motivated peyote use from general controlled
substances statutes, as an example of how legislative accommodation could occur). Although
the Smith Court said that legislative accommodations would be permitted though not
constitutionally required, there is a good chance that the Court's suggestion creates a Catch-22.
Id at 890. At first blush, RFRA appears to be a fair and impartial accommodation treating all
religions equally, however it failed as being beyond the scope of Congress's enumerated
powers. Even if within the scope of Congress's power, some argue that RFRA is
unconstitutional because it violates principles of separation of powers by "reversing" the
Supreme Court and operates as a back door amendment to the Constitution. See Marci A.
Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1, 2-7 (1998). Then, as Justice Stevens suggests, even if RFRA was completely
within the scope of enumerated powers and did not have separation of powers problems, then it
would possibly be a violation of the Establishment Clause because it "provided [religious
groups] with a weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain." See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
The leading critic of RFRA suggests that case-by-case accommodation through the
political process is preferred. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitutional Rhetoric of Religion,
20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 619, 624 (1998) [hereinafter Hamilton, Constitutional Rhetoric]
(arguing that Smith construes religion as a powerful, dynamic force that is capable of entering
"the political battlefield and [securing] the accommodations most important to it"). However,
when accommodation is done on a case-by-case basis, a violation of the Establishment Clause
still looms in the background. The test to be used to measure a potential Establishment Clause
violation would either be the Lemon test or the endorsement test. The first prong of the Lemon
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exercise protection by statutorily mandating greater protection than was
constitutionally required.40 The Judiciary Committee's report echoed Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in justifying RFRA by claiming that strict scrutiny does
not create an absolute right to free exercise but does what rational basis scrutiny
does not, respect free religious exercise as a fundamental right.4 1 Furthermore, the
test is whether the state action has a secular primary purpose. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612 (1971). It is easy to see the inherent difficulties of satisfying that test even with the
example suggested by the Smith Court of certain states' exemptions to generally applicable
drug laws for religious use of peyote. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. Clearly the purposes behind such
laws are religiously motivated or preferential. Likewise, the Court's suggestion would not
withstand the endorsement test. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (articulating for the first time the endorsement test, which was later
used by the Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594-97 (1989)). The
endorsement test looks to see if the government action "sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community," while showing favor to
adherents of the religion endorsed. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688. If religious liberty cannot be
protected constitutionally, it is a hard sell to say that the legislature can authorize some religious
accommodation requests but not others and not communicate endorsement of certain religions
and practices over others.
40 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8-9, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898.
There is a separate question of whether Congress can give more religious protection than is
required by the Constitution. As one court said on the subject when reviewing a religious
accommodation statute, "Smith set only a constitutional floor-not a ceiling-for the protection
of personal liberty." Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002). The
subject of this Note is the difficulty courts are interjecting into efforts to increase religious
liberties protection based on apprehension regarding Establishment Clause violations from
extending protection to religious rights and not other fundamental rights. However, the Court
has pointed out before that when the government lifts a burden on religious exercise there is "no
reason to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities." Corp. of
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,
338 (1987). However, RFRA raised concerns that Congress was violating the separation of
powers, essentially attempting to trump the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First
Amendment. For a strong argument from a Postmodem perspective that this type of wholesale
legislative accommodation might actually be bad for religion, see generally Hamilton,
Constitutional Rhetoric, supra note 39; William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal Protection and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L.
REv. 227 (1995). Notably, one court held that RFRA survived the Court's invalidating the law
as it applied to the states in Boerne, considering it to be still good law as it applies to the federal
government. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854, 857-88 (8th Cir.
1998).
For an interesting case against the wisdom of legislatively accommodating religious
exercise, presuming it is constitutional, see Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative
Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDozo L. REV. 565 (1999).
41 S. REP. No. 103-111, at 7 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1896
(expressing that the textual constitutional mandate of protection from interference should
account for the government's interest by allowing regulation only if there is a compelling
interest that is achieved by narrowly tailored means) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor,
J., concurring)).
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legislative history indicates that the expansive nature of RFRA was necessitated
by the lingering doubts that state and local lawmaking bodies could not be trusted
to craft exceptions to generally applicable laws that fully protected religious
minorities consistent with the principles underlying the Free Exercise Clause.42
RFRA invoked the Remedial Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to assert the
federal government's authority over the States.43
Congress not only responded to Smith through RFRA, but also to O'Lone by
requiring strict scrutiny review even of the free exercise claims brought by
inmates of both state and federal prisons." Echoing previous Supreme Court
decisions that inmates still possess First Amendment Rights, RFRA required that
regulations substantially burdening an inmate's free exercise rights be of the
highest order of penological concem.45 Under RFRA, inmates and the society-at-
large were once again subject to the same, heightened standard of review.
Four years after RFRA was enacted it was invalidated as applied to the States
in City of Boerne v. Flores.46 In Boerne, a Catholic church sought permission to
enlarge its building because attendance at weekly ceremonies was exceeding
seating capacity.47 When the City of Boeme rejected the church's building permit
application because the church building was located within a historic district, as
designated by the city's Historic Landmark Commission,48 Archbishop Flores
sued for relief using RFRA to support his claim on free exercise grounds.4 9 While
Congress had the "power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause" under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment,50 the Boerne Court reasoned it did not follow that
Congress could force states to raise their level of review in free exercise claims
because that was more than was required by the First Amendment under Smith.5l
42 S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897 (citing Barnette,
319 U.S. at 638, which held that the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to place certain
fundamental rights beyond the reach of popular vote).
43 S. REP. No. 103-111, at 13-14, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1903. The
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment relied on by Congress include: "No State shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added); and "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
44 S. REP. No. 103-111, at 9-10, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898-1900.
4 See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 10, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1899 (case
references omitted).
46 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
4 7 1d at 511-12.
48 See id at 512.
49 See id.
5°See id. at 519.
51 See id at 519. "Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot
be said to be enforcing the Clause." Id. The Court explained at great lengths the purpose behind
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In Boerne, the Court held that RFRA overstepped the balance of power
established between the Court and Congress since Marbury v. Madison,52 and it
was not enacted under the authority of any enumerated or implied power of
Congress.53 Even though RFRA was invalidated as it applied to the States, its
heightened standard still controls free exercise claims against the federal
government. 54
It is important to note that Justice Stevens, writing alone in concurrence in
Boerne, opined that RFRA violated the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause.55 He argued that RFRA gave to the religious "a legal weapon that no
atheist or agnostic [could] obtain," which would amount to a "governmental
preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion.' '56 Stevens's reasoning, which
other courts would later adopt, shifted the constitutional issue surrounding
legislative accommodation away from whether legislatures had the authority to
act to whether they violated the Establishment Clause by acting.
C. The Emergence ofRLUIPA as the Alternative to RFRA
Thwarted in its attempts to eliminate the effects of Smith altogether, Congress
acted much less ambitiously in its next attempt to increase free exercise
protection, extending it legislatively only to regulate states in the areas of land use
and treatment of institutionalized persons. The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) was passed in September 2000, this time
under the authority of Congress's Spending and Commerce Clause powers rather
than the Fourteenth Amendment's remedial power.57 The legislative history of
RLUIPA reveals a concern that "[flar more than any other Americans, persons
residing in institutions are subject to the authority of one or a few local officials"
the Fourteenth Amendment's remedial power was to achieve compliance with the Constitution,
not to authorize substantive changes to the law. See id at 520-29.
52 5 U.S. 137(1803).
53 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
54 See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see also
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
55 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring).
56 Id at 537.
57 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(b) (2000).
Scope of application. This section applies in any case in which -
(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal
financial assistance; or
(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect,
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes.
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who "sometimes impose frivolous or arbitrary rules" when it comes to inmates'
rights to practice their faiths.58
RLUIPA's substantive provision is nearly identical to RFRA, requiring that
government action that burdens religious exercise must be justified by a
compelling state interest and be the least restrictive means possible.59 The courts
that have reviewed RLUIPA found it to rest on a firmer foundation than RFRA,
consistently holding it to be a legitimate exercise of Spending and Commerce
power.60 Congress also heeded the separation of powers lesson of Boerne, and
did not design RLUIPA to overrule Smith as RFRA had. By limiting the scope of
RLU1PA, Congress hoped that courts would affirm RLUIPA and hold that Smith
only set the constitutional floor for protecting religious exercise, and legislatures
could raise the ceiling of protection if they so desired.61 Judges, however, would
adopt Justice Stevens's reasoning from Boerne62 and invalidate RLUIPA as a
violation of the Establishment Clause.63 By holding that a statute which protects
the religious exercise of inmates from unwarranted governmental burdens violates
the Establishment Clause because non-religious inmates cannot experience
protection of religious rights, thereby creating an unlawful preference for religion,
the courts embraced Postmodem reasoning and placed religion clause
jurisprudence squarely on Highway 61.
III. THE PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES ON THE RELIGION CLAUSES
In today's age, religion is commonly believed to be a matter of personal
choice.64 If that is the case, it becomes an arbitrary practice for the state to give
58 146 CONG. REC. S7,774-75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000).
59 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a) (2000).
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of [an
institutionalized person]... unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the
burden on that person -
(I) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
Id.
60 See, e.g., Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002); Charles v.
Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003).
61 See, e.g., Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1070.
62 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536-37 (Stevens, J., concurring).
63 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003); Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp.
2d 566 (W.D. Va. 2003), rev'd, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003); Al Ghashiyah v. Dep't of
Corrections, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. 2003), overruled by Charles v. Verhagen, 348
F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003).
64 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1491-92 (1990); see also Rebecca Redwood
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special constitutional protections to an individual who, through an act of
conscience, has chosen to follow a religion, yet withhold those protections from
an equally conscientious individual who has chosen not to adhere to a religion.65
To the Framers of our Constitution, however, religion was an individual's
attempt, regardless of the form it took, to satisfy the demands of the sovereign of
the universe, a fixed unchangeable God to whom all duties flowed. Ultimate
accountability to God was inevitable; it was not a choice.66 Because the Founders
largely presupposed a "universal and transcendent authority beyond human
judgment," 67 protection of religious exercise was not an arbitrary privilege given
to the religious. Instead, it was a necessary recognition of the limitation of civic
authority in light of the ultimate authority.68
Behind the change in understanding the role of religion is the philosophical
shift in worldviews between the time of the founding and this present age. The
prevalent worldview during the founding of the United States was a religiously
inclined Modernity. In the last several decades, the Postmodem worldview has
become more pervasive. With Postmodern thought now influencing courts'
analysis of the Modernity inspired Religion Clauses, it becomes essential to
understand the basic philosophical differences between the Modem and
Postmodem worldview for creating a coherent religion clause jurisprudence. In
section A, this Note will first explore Modernity and its influence over the
creation of the Religion Clauses. Next, in section B, this Note will discuss the
French, From Yoder to Yoda: Models of Traditional, Modem and Postmodern Religion in US.
Constitutional Law, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 77 (identifying a specific model of Postmodem
religion that is regarded to be a matter of personal choice, where "[r]eligion is a self-created
entity or... identity centered in spiritualism, power, and wisdom").
65 McConnell, supra note 64, at 1492 (citing DAVID A. J. RICHARDs, TOLERATION AND
THE CoNsTiTuTIoN 136-146(1986)).
66 See McConnell, supra note 64, at 1445-55. "The demands of civil society must be
judged against the demands of God." Id at 1446. The demands of an all powerful being would
not have been considered optional. "[Religious people] have a Master in heaven, no earthly
power can constrain them to deny his name or desert his cause." Id at 1446 (quoting J.
WITHERSPOON, The Charge of Sedition and Faction Against Good Men, Especially Faithful
Ministers, Considered and Accounted For, in 2 THE WORKS OF THE REV. JOHN WITHERSPOON
415, 427 (Philadelphia 1802)). Use of the word "master" invokes the image of an authority
figure capable of depriving the servant of its own volition. Similarly, James Madison wrote, in
perhaps the most influential document on the Founders regarding the intersection between
religious practice and civic laws, "[i]t is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such
homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him."' Michael W. McConnell, "God
is Dead and We Have Killed Him! ": Freedom of Religion in the Post modem Age, 1993 BYU
L. REV. 163, 169 (1993) (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments § 1 (1785), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting)). Madison's words suggest the only element of choice is in how to
render homage to God, not whether it should be rendered.
67 McConnell, supra note 64, at 1497.
68 See id at 1497-98.
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shift to Postmodemism, focusing particularly on its impact on thought regarding
religion.
A. The Constitution Was Written Under the Sway of (Pre)Modernity
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. 69
1. Philosophical Origins of Modernity
Generally, Modernity existed as the predominant philosophical worldview
from the Renaissance to the post-Enlightenment industrial age 70 roughly from
164871 to 1945.72 Ren6 Descartes's maxim, "I think, therefore I am,"73 earned
him the label of father of Modem philosophy.74 The philosophy of Descartes
6 9 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
7 0 See STANLEY J. GRENZ, A PRIMER ON POSTMODERNISM 57-61 (1996). The
Renaissance gave rise to humanism, which focused on humanity's potential and increased
appreciation for the natural world, essentially laying the foundation for "modem scientific
enterprise." This was a stark contrast to the Middle Ages, which focused on the study of God as
the highest of human callings. The Enlightenment, or the Age of Reason, (roughly 1650 to
1800) followed the Renaissance and amounted to a revolution in man's understanding of the
world through science. Mastery of science enabled people to have greater control of the
physical world, which ushered in the Industrial Age, which at once had the effect of civilizing
and dehumanizing people. "Modem" thought, as I am using the term, spanned these three
distinct historical periods.
71 See id. The Modem era began at the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War in 1648 with
the Peace of Westphalia, which made provisions for freedom of religion on the European
continent. See Peace of Westphalia Treaty, Oct. 24, 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 198. Interestingly, it
was also the year that "[t]he term 'free exercise' first appeared in an American legal document"
when Lord Baltimore required the government in Maryland to refrain from interfering with
Christians' exercise of religion in the colony. McConnell, supra note 64, at 1425.
7 2 See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 28 (2000) (citing the Holocaust as "the most
important social event precipitating a transition from modernism to postmodemism").
73 RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD AND MEDIATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSPHY,
PART4, 21 (David Weissman ed., 1996).
But immediately afterwards I noticed that whilst I thus washed to think all things false, it
was absolutely essential that the 'I' who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking
that this truth 'I think, therefore I am' was so certain and so assured that all the most
extravagant suppositions brought forward by the skeptics were incapable of shaking it, I
came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the
Philosophy for which I was seeking.
Id.
74 See GRENZ, supra note 70, at 63. Descartes rejected empirical senses as being
epistemologically untrustworthy. From this position of doubt, he concluded that the certainty of
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represented an important departure from divine revelation as the source of
knowledge, to a rational autonomous individual deducing from the one
foundational truth, the fact of self-existence, all other hidden truths with
certainty. 75 Even though the discovered knowledge or truth was understood to be
absolute, it was necessarily discovered egocentrically. The object was to achieve
perfect reasoning in order to prevent skewing discoveries with personal
experience and knowledge. 76
The Cartesian or rational model of epistemology envisions a passive mind
coming to knowledge by observing the objective world. Immanuel Kant
introduced a "transcendental" way of knowing, which required the active
participation of the mind.77 Kant focused on moral duty, or oughtness, which he
argued was knowable to all humans through innate a priori knowledge that could
be imposed on reality.78 Rather than limiting knowledge of intangible objects that
could not be experienced through the senses (such as God and freedom) 79 to what
could be deduced through observation as under the Cartesian model, Kant argued
intangible concepts could be fully known through "practical reason."80 Kant's
practical reason incorporated a belief that there was a universal moral duty of
absolute right and wrongs that was knowable through the categorical imperative
to "treat each rational individual 'always as an end and never as a means."' 81 This
his own existence was unquestionable. Using this first principle and foundational truth,
Descartes reasoned that humans were autonomous rational subjects who through skepticism
and deduction could conclude with certainty other absolute truths. See FELDMAN, supra note
72, at 22. The Modem philosophers that followed "accepted the Cartesian method of beginning
with doubt and insisting that every belief be considered false until proven true .... GREENZ,
supra note 70, at 64-65. Descartes reduced his concept of self to reason and the rational being,
the foundational principle of Modernity.
75 See FELDMAN, supra note 72, at 22; GRENZ, supra note 70, at 64. The scientific world
was making discoveries at an unprecedented pace by mimicking Cartesian skepticism's reason
model of epistemology. Scientists shifted their endeavors away from metaphysical pursuits and
focused their study of natural phenomena by "applying analytical techniques to produce
quantifiable results." GRENZ, supra note 70, at 66. Science in this age concluded that the natural
world or reality was intelligible, and that humans had the ability to understand the objective
principles underlying the universe, making them capable of subduing and transforming it. The
work of Newton, Copernicus, and Galileo, who by building on the work of Bacon were able to
explain the rational consistency of the physical world, can be seen as the high point of the new
model for science. See FELDMAN, supra note 72, at 17; GRENZ, supra note 70, at 66-67. This
objectivist view that reality is knowable through reason, is the hallmark of Modem thought.
76 See GRENZ, supra note 70, at 64.
77 Id. at 74-75.
78 See id at 77-78; FELDMAN, supra note 72, at 26.
79 Kant called this noumena. GRENZ, supra note 70, at 77.
80 See id. at 77.
81 FELDMAN, supra note 72, at 26 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
(Theodore M. Greene ed., 1929 (1781)). See GRENZ, supra note 70, at 77-78 ("Act as if the
2004] 1037
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
is the transcendental pretense essential to Modem thought; that through reflecting
on self all universal truths could be known.82
While faith in pure reason was the cornerstone of Modem philosophy, the
conception of God was still the center of early Modernist understanding of the
world.83 Having rejected divine revelation as a way of knowing, Modernity
turned instead to analyzing the natural world and seeking transcendental
knowledge to inform its understanding of God.84 Through this endeavor, "natural
laws" became self-evident truths that were universally accessible, which could be
used to guide human relations and establish systems of government.85 Modem
philosophy espoused that the progressive increase in knowledge brought the
ability to make humans happy, rational, and free.86 Since reason and nature were
accessible to all people and could be used to discover ultimate truth, which led to
happiness, there came an increased emphasis on individual autonomy as the value
of external authorities diminished.87 Although a generally accepted belief in God
survived this Age of Reason, the church's preeminent role in society, often as a
partner with the state, did not.88 The Modem emphasis on autonomy encouraged
maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Law of Nature.") (quoting
IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 38 (Thomas
K. Abbott trans., Bobbs-Merrill, 1949)).
82 GRENZ, supra note 70, at 78-80.
83 Some refer to this early Modernity as Pre-modemist, but I think this is based on the
faulty assumption that Modernism is necessarily antagonistic to belief in the spiritual.
84 See GRENz, supra note 70, at 68. Central to the modem metaphysical notion of God
was the assumption of harmony in the natural world, a belief that reality was inherently orderly
and ultimately reasonable. Truth could not be relative, so the variation of conclusions drawn
from nature were attributable to failing to fully conform understanding to reality.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 71.
87 See id. at 69 (emphasizing that "autonomy demanded that each person discover and
follow the universal natural law"). "'One of the central themes, perhaps indeed the central
obsession, of Cartesian rationalism is the aspiration for autonomy. There is the overwhelming
desire for... self-creation .... ' Steven D. Smith, Religious Freedom in America, in LAW AND
RELIGION: A CRrnCAL ANTHOLOGY 15, 20 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) (quoting ERNEST
GELLNER, REASON AND CULTURE 157 (1992)).
88 GRENz, supra 70, at 71 ("The Age of Reason marked the end of the dominance of the
church in Westem culture."). Interestingly, the power of the church was diminished in part by a
religious movement: the Reformation. While the Reformation was a Pre-Modem occurrence, it
contributed to the Modem view of the world in several ways: 1) Societal authorities were no
longer inviolable because of religious tradition as was evident from the Protestant
challenge to the Catholic church; 2) Enhanced commitment to individualism favored
personal access to God without the need for priestly intervention; 3)Theological dualism,
or two-kingdom, theology emerged as an increasingly popular lens through which to view
government and; 4) Separation between the secular realm and the spiritual realm gained
strength as authority of the state did not have to be validated by religious authority.
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the political belief in liberalism that "places individual freedom at the center of
political aspiration." 89 Although the church's influence was waning, two
Protestant theological ideas, the two-kingdoms theology and soul liberty, were
essential to conceiving the limited government required by political liberalism.90
Two-kingdoms theology articulated a belief that there were two sovereigns, an
earthly power and a spiritual one, with ultimate allegiance owed to God.91 Soul
liberty "is the belief that faith, to be valid and acceptable to God, must be
uncoerced. ' '92
2. The Influence of Modern Thought on the First Amendment
The Modem worldview was most prevalent at the end of the Eighteenth
Century, the time period that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were written,
debated, and ratified as the supreme law of the land. It is undeniable that the
Constitution,. particularly the religion clauses, was written under the sway of
Modemity. James Madison, the framer of greatest influence over the Bill of
Rights, was highly sympathetic to the Modem understanding of religion and the
need to limit government to prevent encroachment into the religious lives of the
governed.93 However, the desire of the Framers to protect religion was not
entirely motivated by deference to religion. Many argued that religious protection
was necessary from a civic perspective to ensure harmony among the citizenry. 94
The historical record of the drafting of the First Amendment reveals two
noteworthy Modem influences on the formulation of the religion clauses.95
8 9 See McConnell, supra note 66, at 166-67 (noting that historically, liberalism originated
in religious ideals and is distinct from present day secular political liberalism).90 See id. at 166-72. Two-kingdoms theology's focus on the obligation of the individual to
follow the dictates of conscience out of duty to God, and soul liberty's suspicion of coercion
were highly influential the First Amendment rights of free exercise and antiestablishment. Id.
91 See id at 167-70. Two-kingdoms theology essentially amounts to giving to Caesar
what is Caeser's and to God what is God's. See Matthew 22:21.
92 See McConnell, supra note 66, at 170.
93 See McConnell, supra note 64, at 1452-55.
94 See id. at 1442-43 (stating that"[tihe paradox of the religious freedom debate[] ... is
that one side employed essentially secular arguments based on the need[] for civil society for
the support of religion, while the other side employed essentially religious arguments...").
95 See McConnell, supra note 64, at 1480-85. Most drafting history regarding the religion
clauses must be gleaned from successive draft proposals, as the debates surrounding the
proposals went largely unrecorded. Id at 1481. The first proposal in the House was written by
Madison and read, "[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or
worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, nor on any pretext, infringed." Id The version that went to the
floor came from the Select Committee, which modified Madison's original to read, "no religion
shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed." Id. at 1482.
That differed from the version ultimately passed the House which read, "Congress shall make
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Congress chose "prohibiting" to describe the forbidden effect on the free exercise
of religion, over "preventing" or "infringing" from earlier drafts, or "abridging" as
used to describe the forbidden effect on other First Amendment rights.96 Contrary
to the view espoused by the Supreme Court recently that Congress had a freer
hand with religious exercise than the press,97 Madison argued that free exercise
and freedom of the press were "equally and completely exempted from all
authority whatever of the United States."'98 The other Modem influence
discemable in the drafting history was that the phrase "Free Exercise of Religion"
ultimately stood alone, and the phrase "Rights of Conscience" was omitted from
the final version.99 "By deleting references to 'conscience,' the final version of
the [F]irst [A]mendment singles out religion for special treatment," since only a
duty owed to God could justify limiting the reach of the earthly sovereign.' 00 As
ratified in 1791, the First Amendment presupposed the existence of God.
B. The Constitution Is Being Interpreted in a Postmodern Age: "God Is
Dead "101
1. Philosophical Foundations of Postmodernism
Postmodemism as a worldview reacts to or rejects the basic premises of
Modernity,102 particularly the belief that "[k]nowledge can only be justified to the
extent it rests on indubitable foundations,"' 103 Friedrich Nietzsche, who has been
called the "patron saint of [P]ostmodem philosophy,"'04 proclaimed the death of
no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of
conscience." Id.
The Senate considered two versions before settling on this third attempt, "Congress shall
make no law establishing Articles of faith or mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise
of religion." Id at 1484. The final version that came out of Conference Committee was
ultimately enshrined as the First Amendment, "Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
96 McConnell, supra note 64, at 1486-88.
97 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
98 McConnell, supra note 64, at 1487-88.
99 See id at 1488.
'
00 See id at 1491.
101 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA (Manuel Komroff ed., Tudor
Publishing Co. 1928).
10 2 See GRENz, supra note 70, at 2.
103 See DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 152, 153 (1996) (explaining that
Postmodemism rejects epistemological foundationalisrn, which holds that there is absolute truth
and it is knowable, especially that resting on religious authority).
104 GRENz, supra note 70, at 88. Nietzsche as a philosopher was a nihilist. His ideas are
important to Postmodemism, but they do not fully capture the complexity of present day
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God'0 5 in what amounted to a rejection of Modem thought, primarily a rejection
of the idea of a "unifying center." 10 6 Postmodemism rejects Cartesian dualism as
a delusional belief that thinking humans are capable of pure reason because it
ignores the reality that the human self was also an object "enmeshed in social
networks."'1 7 Likewise, Postmodemism also rejects the "Kantian fiction of an
objective world existing in its own right beyond the self' 1 8 Any attempts to
conceptualize the objective world would necessarily be limited because human
will and experience necessarily distort an individual's perception. 10 9 Rather than
deriving value from absolute, objective truth, Postmodemism conceives of
nonessentialism, a belief acknowledging the subjectivity of reality and that
"things have value.. .only to the extent that we give them value.""10 Since
Postmodem thought understands truth as an individual's preference between
Postmodem thought. Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Richard Rorty are the leading
figures of Postmodemism, but each stood on the shoulders of Nietzche. For a more complete
introduction to Postmodemism, see THE POSTMODERN READER (Charles Jencks ed., 1992).
105 This famous quote is from Nietzsche's landmark work THUs SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA
(1883). Nietzsche saw himself as a physician of culture who could cure some of the defects of
humanity by remystifying its conception of reality, that is, by eliminating the false notions, such
as the human conception of God, which, in his view, created an unmerited sense of certainty.
106 GRENz, supra note 70, at 83. Michel Foucault rejected the unifying center concept
when he identified as fundamental errors of Western civilization beliefs that 1) an objective
body of knowledge exists and is waiting to be discovered, 2) such knowledge can be possessed
and is neutral or value free, and 3) the pursuit of knowledge benefits all humankind and not just
a particular class. Id at 131.
107 Id at 86. This was described by the prominent Postmodem philosopher Richard Rorty
as an "unhelpful tendency of Westem philosophy and culture to assume that the knowing self
can occupy a position beyond the ebb and flow of our historical context" erroneously imagining
"that they can transcend the vocabulary and practices of their own time and discover a
universal, timeless, necessary, ahistorical 'truth."' Id. at 156-57.
108 Id at 87.
'
09 See id at 92-93.
110 GRENz, supra note 70, at 93 (stating Postmodemism's understanding of perspectivism
leads to the conclusion that attempts to conceptualize reality objectively result in deception
rather than knowledge and destroy "the original richness of human experience"). Belief that all
value is relational, rather than an object having intrinsic value is called nonessentialism. See id.
at 152.
One of the resounding themes of Postmodem thought is that language is an insufficient
tool to adequately represent reality, counter to the Modem conception of language. See
PATTERSON, supra note 103, at 160-61. For examples of how Postmodemism views language,
particularly within the context of law, see Stephen M. Feldman, How to Be Critical, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 893 (2000); Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its
Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505 (1992); and M.B.W. Sinclair,
Postmodern Argumentation: Deconstructing the Presidential Age Limitation, 43 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 451 (1999).
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varying interpretations, it dismisses religious efforts to uncover "universal,
timeless, necessary, ahistorical" truth as unhelpful.I 11
2. Postmodernism 's Effect on the Understanding of Religion
Beliefs about religion's relationship to government that are unique to
Modernism have been challenged by the emergence of Postmodernism. For
example, the principle of liberalism, which under Modernity required a
government to have limited reach into the religious sphere, has been transformed
into an ideology championing individualism, independence, and rationality under
Postmodemism. "12 While these are principles rooted in the Modem conception of
liberalism, as applied to religion these principles have taken a distinctly
Postmodem incarnation, eschewing the idea of foundational truth, which is the
crux of traditional religious belief. Postmodem individualism elevates
independent conscientious belief over religious beliefs that contain
communitarian elements, which are perceived as compromising individuality."13
Independence as articulated by the present age requires that individuals choose
their own religions, contradicting the Modem view that individuals were duty
bound to comply with the mandates of God, the only choice being whether to
rebel or obey.14 Additionally, Postmodem rationality opposes faith and tradition
to the point of teetering on the brink of nihilistic skepticism. ''5
Another shift away from Modernity is the Postrmodem emphasis on tolerance
of religion rather than the free exercise of religion. 116 Tolerant neutrality
manifests itself by imposing a requirement of secularity in the public sphere,
111 See GRENZ, supra note 70, at 157-58. Richard Rorty is the leading proponent of a non-
nihilistic, non-relativistic Postmodemism, where truth is shaped by individuals rather than
waiting to be discovered in hopes of "getting [it] right," and though pluralistic, this philosophy
does not concede that all conceptions of truth are equal. Id at 157.
112 McConnell, supra note 66, at 172.
113 See id at 172-73 (recognizing that mutual obligation and submission, which are
elements of traditional religions, could be "authoritarian, irrational, and divisive," which is not a
risk run with truly individualized beliefs).
1 14 See id. at 173 (reiterating the modem belief that individuals are chosen by God and the
duty of conscience is to obey God's moral order in contrast to the Postmodem belief that
independence is conforming to no one but oneself).
115 See id. at 173-74 (pointing out that religion is seen by some as a divisive force
"fundamentally incompatible with the intellectual cornerstone of the modem democratic state").
See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993).
116 See McConnell, supra note 66, at 175-76 (pointing out that tolerance as a value is a
misnomer, because frequently unpopular beliefs are not tolerated, indicating that the
Postmodern mind is only neutral to that to which it is indifferent). Tolerance of religion was
originally the goal espoused by John Locke and Thomas Jefferson of government's relationship
to religion, but it lost out to Madison's view of government being obligated to allow the free
exercise of religion. See McConnell, supra note 64, at 1449-55.
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requiring religious individuals to keep their faith to themselves. 17 Finally,
Postmodemism accepted the expansion of government, creating a regulatory state
in contrast to the Modem ideal of limited scope of government power."i 8 By
increasing the reach of government into realms previously the province of
religion, such as education, social welfare, and moral instruction,I 9 conflicts
between religion and state, which had been extremely rare, became increasingly
common after the end of World War 11.120 Religion as viewed by Postmodemism,
rather than being a part of the search for truth, becomes just another expression of
individual belief entitled to no more protection than any other secularized
expression of belief 121
IV. THE POSTMODERN INFLUENCE ON RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Cutter v. Wilkinson: A Case Study in Postmodern Religion Clause
Jurisprudence
Until 2000, pending lawsuits filed by religious inmates against state prison
officials claiming prison regulations infringed on their free exercise rights had
117 See McConnell, supra note 66, at 174. See also RICHARD NEUHAUS, THE NAKED
PUBLIC SQUARE 148 (1984) ("We are arriving at the point where the privileged status of
religion, which was clearly the intention of the First Amendment, is becoming the most
particular handicap of religion....Pluralism is a jealous God. When [it] is established as dogma,
there is no room for other dogmas.").
I 18 See McConnell, supra note 66, at 177-78. Winnifried Sullivan correctly notes the
division of church from state into two separate provinces was a uniquely modem conception.
See Winnifred F. Sullivan, A New Discourse and Practice, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRmcAL
ANTHOLOGY 35, 38 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000). Sullivan suggests that Postmodem
influence in government was brought about by a concern for suppressed communities. Id. at
38-39.
119 McConnell, supra note 66, at 177.
120 See McConnell, supra note 64, at 1503. Indeed, the vast majority of the case law on
the religion clauses emerged in the last half of the Twentieth Century. Scholars have noted that
the Religion Clauses were not heavily litigated in the first century of the Republic. Indeed, the
first decision regarding the Free Exercise Clause was not decided until 1879, and the first
decision regarding the Establishment Clause was handed down in 1899. Michael W.
McConnell, The Supreme Court's Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows on Religious-
Cultural-Political Conflict in the Early Republic 37 TULSA L. REv. 7, 7 (2001). McConnell
cited to conducting public education in a plurastic society as one of the chief reasons for the
increase in litigation over First Amendment religion issues following World War U. Id. At 27.
In another article, McConnell and Judge Posner suggest that increased government aid to
education and healthcare led to an increase in litigation involving religion issues because of the
great number of educational and medical facilities with connections to organized religions.
Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious
Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 8 (1989).
121 See id. at 1416.
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little chance of success, because a refusal to grant religious accommodations only
had to be justified by "legitimate penalogical objectives.' 122 The passage of
RLUIPA meant that prisoners could augment their First Amendment claims with
a statutorily created requirement that religious exercise be accommodated, unless
there is a compelling interest that justifies the infringement, and there is no less
restrictive means of achieving that interest. 123 Many of the states' departments of
corrections (DOC) officials believed that the return of strict scrutiny, and with it
the presumption that state action was unconstitutional, would threaten a well-
ordered prison and prove too burdensome on the cash-strapped correctional
system. DOCs influenced defendants in RLUIPA actions to assert the affirmative
defense that RLUIPA was unconstitutional. 124
A DOC mounted a successful defense in the Sixth Circuit case Cutter v.
Wilkinson.125 Cutter involved the claims of inmates belonging to fringe religious
groups, such as Wiccans, Asatru, or members of a splinter group of the Church of
God Christian, 126 whose requests included primarily religious literature and
limited assembly rights for religious services. The inmates won their suit in the
122 This standard was required by Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Judges
hearing such claims are also required to exhibit strong deference to the decisions of prison
officials. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
123 See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc- 1(2000).
124 In the context of prisons, states that have challenged RLUIPA's constitutionality
include Michigan (Johnson v. Martin, 223 F. Supp. 2d 820 (W.D. Mich. 2002)); Ohio (Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003)); Wisconsin (Kilaab Al Ghashiyah v. Dep't of Corr.,
250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. 2003)); Massachusetts (Gordon v. Pepe, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4623 (D. Mass. 2003)); Virginia (Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566 (W.D. Va.
2003)); Illinois (Vineyard Christian Fellowship v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D.
Ill. 2003)); California (Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2001)); Missouri
(Murphy v. Missouri Dep't of Corr., 372 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2004)). The DOCs argue that
RLUIPA either exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce or Spending Clauses, or
violates the Establishment Clause. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 259.
125 349 F.3d at 268-69.
126 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions notes that what might be
considered witchcraft is often known as Wicca, which "is embedded in a wider neo-
Paganism .... Followers of Wicca seek their inspiration in pre-Christian sources, European
folklore, and mythology." THE CONCISE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF WORLD RELIGIONS 638-39
(John Bowker ed., 2000). Asatru is identified as a revival of Norse heathenism and the
mythology of Scandinavia, which in its modem incarnation often has racist beliefs grafted onto
its core tenants. B.A. Robinson, Asatru, in RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, at
http://www.religioustolerance.org/asatru.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2004). A website identifies
the Worldwide Church of God as being founded in Anglo/British Israelism, a belief that Anglos
"are the spiritual and literal descendants of the ancient Israelites" and that people claiming to be
Jewish today are actually Gentiles. B.A. Robinson, The Worldwide Church of God, in
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/wwcog.htm (last visited Sept. 18,
2004).
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district court but lost on appeals as RLUIPA was held to be an unconstitutional
violation of the Establishment Clause because it failed the Lemon test. 127
The Cutter Court began its analysis of the constitutional issues by discussing
Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Boerne, in which he concluded that
RLUIPA's predecessor, RFRA, violated the Establishment Clause.128 Stevens'
reasoning, that since the statute "provided the Church with a legal weapon that no
atheist or agnostic can obtain" it constitutes a "governmental preference for
religion, as opposed to irreligion," thus violating the First Amendment religion
principles, is invoked as the polestar for the court to follow. 129 RLUIPA, the
Cutter Court concluded, violated the Establishment Clause "because it favor[ed]
religious rights over other fundamental rights without any showing that religious
rights are at any greater risk of deprivation."'' 30
1. Cutter Found RL UIPA Violates the Purpose Prong of the Lemon Test.
To assess the Establishment Clause claim, the court analyzed RLUIPA under
the three-pronged establishment test from Lemon v. Kurtzman.1'1 The first prong
requires that a secular purpose exist to justify state action. However, the Cutter
court imposed an additional requirement of neutrality to the test, which was
articulated as a prohibition against government endorsement of a specific religion
or general promotion of religion.' 32 By interpreting the secular purpose
requirement of Lemon 133 to focus on strict neutrality, the Cutter court imposes a
127 Cutter, 349 F.3d at 268. (referring to the test originating in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) used as a framework to evaluate Establishment Clause claims, which
requires a secular purpose for the state action, a primary or principal effect which neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and does not result in excessive entanglement between religion
and the state).
128 Cutter, 349 F.3d at 261 (citing to Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536-37 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
129 /d. (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536-37). The Cutter Court also relied heavily on two
district court cases that followed Stevens' reasoning and found that RLUIPA violated the First
Amendment See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 262 (citing to Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566
(W.D. Va. 2003), rev'd by Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Kilaab Al
Ghashiyah v. Dep't of Corr., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. 2003), overruled by Charles v.
Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003).
130 Cutter, 349 F.3d at 262 (reaching this conclusion without ever considering RLUIPA's
validity under the Commerce or Spending powers).
131 Id. at 262-63.
132 Cutter, 349 F.3d at 262 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) for
the proposition that "government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to
irreligion").
133 In Lemon, the Court required that the state must "have a secular legislative purpose."
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. This was not seen as being identical to a position of complete
neutrality or indifference toward religion. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 676 (1984), the Court
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higher standard for statutes touching on religion than is constitutionally
required. 134 Under this more vigorous framework, the court concludes that since
RLUIPA is so broadly written to accommodate all religious exercise, the law
abandons neutrality because it advances religious rights generally in prisons over
other constitutionally protected conduct. 135
Driving the Cutter court's finding that RLUIPA abandons neutrality was its
belief that RLUIPA imposes a "revolutionary" change in the treatment of free
exercise claims of inmates by requiring DOC regulations to withstand strict
scrutiny. 136 The Cutter court suggested that such a revolution could only be
approved a state-funded display of the nativity scene, included with other holiday decorations,
on non-public grounds as constitutional. The Lynch Court chastised the lower court, which held
otherwise, for inferring that a religious display like a creche could not also have a secular
purpose. Id at 681. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote that a secular purpose
that in reality is dominated by a religious purpose would not be permissible. Id. at 691
(O'Connor, J., concurring). But the underlying assumption is that a dominant secular purpose
would mitigate the influence of any religious purpose for state action. Id In his concurring
opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), Justice Powell reasserted that the court has
"not interpreted the first prong of Lemon.. .as requiring that a statute have 'exclusively secular'
objectives." Id at 64 (Powell, J., concurring).
134 See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 263 (claiming that the purpose prong prohibits the
"governmental decisionmaker... from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of
promoting a particular point of view in religious matters") (quoting Corporation of Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)).
However, in that case, the Court only introduced the idea of neutrality after stating that the
Establishment Clause has never been interpreted to require that a law's purpose be unrelated to
religion. The Amos Court held that the purpose of alleviating the burden on religious
organizations was a permissible legislative purpose. Id. at 335. In doing so, the Court never
analyzed whether such an action was neutral to religion; it appeared to assume that doing so did
not promote "a particular point of view in religious matters." Id at 335.
135 Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264. The Court distinguished the case from Amos in two relevant
ways. The first difference between Amos and RLUIPA is that the accommodation approved in
Amos was made to prevent a violation of the Establishment Clause by giving religious
organizations exemptions to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act regarding hiring and employment
decisions. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-36. If religious organizations were not exempted, the
reasoning was that the state would be interfering too much with the activities of an organized
religion. As there is no Establishment Clause issue that RLUIPA alleviates, the legislative
accommodation is not justified under this reasoning. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 263. The second is that
the statute in Amos made a highly specific exception, while RLUIPA creates an exemption
from laws of general applicability to all religious acts. Id at 263--64.
136 See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265 (addressing RLUIPA's practical effect of requiring DOC
officials to show that prison regulations are justified under the strict scrutiny standard instead of
the lesser showing of a reasonable relation to a legitimate penalogical interest (citing Turner,
482 U.S. at 81-83; and O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 350-51)). The court uses the scope of the law as a
proxy for the purpose of RLUIPA. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264 ("The broader scope of
RLUIPA suggests that its actual purpose is not to accommodate religion by removing a
particular obstacle to religious exercise, but 'to advance religion in prisons relative to other
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acceptable if Congress acted on information that "religious rights are at greater
risk of deprivation in the prison system than other fundamental rights."' 137 Since
Congress made no such finding, the court found RLUIPA had the impermissible
effect of giving "'greater protection to religiously motivated conduct than other
conscientious conduct.'" 38 By lifting a limitation "on one right while ignoring all
others," the court asserted that Congress abandoned neutrality toward these
fundamental rights, as it "plac[ed] its power behind one system of belief," thus
violating the Establishment Clause.' 39
2. Cutter Found That RL UIPA Violates the Effects Prong of the Lemon
Test
Satisfied that RLUIPA violates the purpose prong of the Lemon test, the court
proceeded to the second prong, which requires that state action cannot have the
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 140 Again, the test articulated by the
court varies from the original articulation of the test, 14 1 their version requiring that
government action cannot convey a message of endorsing or disapproving
religion.' 42 Cutter also enhances the endorsement test by asking, "(1) whether a
particular government action benefits both secular and religious entities, and (2)
whether the action will induce religious exercise, rather than only protecting
it."'143 Under these criteria, RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause because it
impermissibly advances religion by giving "greater protection to religious rights
than to other constitutionally protected rights."'44
constitutionally protected conduct,"' thus abandoning neutrality.) (quoting Ghashiyah, 250 F.
Supp. 2d at 1027).
137 Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265.
138 Id (quoting Ghashiyah, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 1027).
139 Id. (citing Madison, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 577, rev'd by Madison, 355 F.3d at 322).
14 0 See id. at 264 (invoking the effects prong of the Lemon test, but using the variation
suggested in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
141 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 ("[I]ts principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.").
142 Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264. The endorsement test originated in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (0'
Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor explained that there were two ways of running afoul
of the Establishment Clause-entanglement or endorsement. Id. at 687-88. Endorsement sends
messages that individuals will have an improved or denigrated status in society because of their
religious beliefs and the government's actions in respect of those beliefs. Id at 688. As
articulated by O'Connor, the test required that an assumption of either endorsement or
disapproval existed wherever there was a plain case of governmental religious discrimination.
Id at 689. In Lynch, the application of the endorsement test resulted in finding the city-owned
display of the creche constitutionally permissible. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94.
143 Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264.
144 Id
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RLUIPA fails the first part of this endorsement test because the court
concluded that the added protection of religious activity can only benefit religious
entities, not secular ones. 145 The court also held that RLUIPA fails the second
part of the endorsement test as articulated in Cutter because it induces inmates to
be religious and engage in religious activity.' 46 Since prison rules would not
apply with the same force to religious inmates, the court reasoned, it follows that
inmates will become religious in order to receive the benefit of more lax
regulation. 147 The court reasoned that in light of the reality of prison life,
RLUIPA will make the pull of religion so strong that is should be considered an
inducement.' 48 Through RLUIPA, the court argues that the government gives
religious prisoners preferred status in prisons, thereby impermissibly endorsing
religion over irreligion, and creating an inducement for all prisoners to embrace a
religion of their own. Satisfied that RLUIPA failed the first two prongs of the
Lemon test, the Cutter court stopped its analysis and held that RLUIPA violated
the Establishment Clause.
B. A Critique of Cutter's Analysis As Postmodern
Cutter is a great example of the fundamental inability of Postmodem thought
to understand or accept the Modem philosophical assumptions that motivate the
religion clauses. Both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause
were reinterpreted from their Modem origins to fit a Postmodern mold. The result
is a First Amendment religion clause jurisprudence that would be
incomprehensible and unjustifiable not only to the Framers, but also to a
predominately Modem mind. By holding that the state cannot protect free
exercise rights, without violating the Establishment Clause, unless it also protects
other fundamental rights from state interference, the Cutter court has replaced the
Modem idea of separation of church and state with the Postmodern idea of
absolute neutrality between secular and religious ideals as the reason for the
Establishment Clause. By holding that religion can be protected from state
interference only if all other forms of conscientious beliefs and actions are
similarly protected, the Cutter court has replaced the Modem presupposition that
God exists for the Postmodern belief that there is no foundational, essential truth
as the guiding principle of the Free Exercise Clause.
145 See id, at 266 (noting that a religious white supremacist would get a higher standard of
review for his request for religiously motivated racist literature, but a similarly situated secular
white supremacist would get a lower standard of review for an identical request for politically
motivated racist literature).
146 Id
147 Id. at 266-67 (citing Ghashiyah, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 1029, overruled by Charles v.
Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601,610-11(7th Cir. 2003)).
148 See id at 266.
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1. It is Postmodern to Require Absolute Neutrality Between Religious and
Secular Ideals Under the Establishment Clause
The Postmodem imposition of absolute neutrality was evidenced by the
court's grafting neutrality onto the secular purpose prong of Lemon, requiring that
the government's purpose cannot be the endorsement or disapproval of
religion. 149 It was a subtle shift away from what Lemon originally required, that
there only be a secular purpose for the law. 150 Making establishment synonymous
with endorsement in Lynch and its progeny enlarged the concept of neutrality.'51
The Cutter court seized on the reasoning of Lynch and expanded establishment
even further to include not only the endorsement of a specific religion, but also
promotion of the idea that religion is something uniquely worthy of protection.
The principles of separation are subsumed by adherence to this extreme notion of
neutrality. The Postmodem holding is that a state action limiting government
interference with religion must be unconstitutional because it promotes "a
particular point of view in religious matters."' 5 2
149 Cutter, 349 F.3d at 263 (using a variation of the Lemon test first articulated in Lynch,
465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). The standard was reiterated by O'Connor in
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Wallace, she concluded that a statute
allowing school students to have a moment of silence for prayer and meditation endorsed
religion by encouraging prayer. Id at 79. The endorsement test was eventually applied as an
Establishment test by the Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989)
(holding that a creche display in a government building was an endorsement of religion).
150 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 603. Under the original test, even a religious purpose for a statute
could be tolerated, so long as there was a secular purpose that dominated the intent. See Lynch,
465 U.S. at 691 (stating that a secular purpose dominated by a religious purpose is not good
enough, but the Court went on to decide that there was a religious purpose behind displaying
the creche, which did not work to create an Establishment violation).
151 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Lynch's endorsement test was
espoused only as an alternative, when blatant favoritism or discrimination between religions
existed, or just political divisiveness, but somehow was allusive under the Lemon test. Id at
689. O'Connor identifies two ways of running afoul of the Establishment Clause. Both require
that adherence to a religion affect a person's standing in the political community. The first is
entanglement between the state and religious institutions, interfering with independence, giving
benefits, or creating constituencies based on religion. Id. at 688. The second, which O'Connor
identifies as a more direct infringement, is endorsement. If a state action plainly embodies
intentional discrimination, then when understood in light of Lemon there is a presumption of
endorsement, which can only be overcome by a showing of a compelling interest that motivated
the state actor. Id at 689. In my reading, O'Connor says that neutrality is only relevant after
separation has been breached. If there is no breach of separation (understood as entanglement),
then there should be no application of the endorsement analysis.
152 Cutter, 349 F.3d at 263 (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 335). An Establishment Clause
jurisprudence that emphasizes absolute neutrality would be incompatible with the clause that
protects the free exercise of religion, if Postmodern interpretation did not expand the Free
Exercise Clause to protect non-religious conscientious belief.
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The understanding that the Establishment Clause requires absolute neutrality
is rooted in the Postmodem values of tolerance, individualism, and
independence. 153 Tolerance from a Postmodem perspective begins with the
premise that "individuals have no legitimate interest in the attitudes, opinions, and
character of others within the community."'1 54 Therefore, society has no reason to
try to influence the thoughts of others. 15 As religion is based on the Modem
premise that there is one absolute, foundational truth, religion necessarily
implicates the personally, and privately, held beliefs of others. 156 Incorporating
tolerance with a zealous anti-foundationalism, Postmodem thinkers concluded
that government neutrality in all religious matters is essential. The Postmodem
version of the liberal ideals of individualism and independence solidify this view.
Independence, the belief in absolute autonomy, objects to perceived attempts to
influence the individual in regard to such personally held beliefs that are the
subject of religion. The ideal of individualism suggests that influence by the state
in a matter of personal conscience is less desirable than being uninfluenced by
other extemal sources. The Postmodem requirement of absolute neutrality makes
it preferential for the government to infringe on free exercise of religion if only
incidentally rather than promoting or even protecting free exercise. The
Postmodem mind is either blissfully ignorant of or simply unwilling or unable to
reconcile the soul liberty justification which originally inspired the Establishment
Clause. 157
The interpretation of RLUIPA by the Cutter court is a demonstration of the Postmodem
literary theory of deconstruction at its finest. The premise for deconstruction is that no
proposition can be limited to a single meaning and often the more important message is in the
subtext. The act of interpretation, then, is like a game. See GRENZ, supra note 70, at 113-14
(explaining the linguistic theory of Ludwig Wittgenstein who sees interpretation as a "language
game"); see also id. at 132 (discussing Michel Foucault's view that knowledge is linked to
power and objects are brought into being by identifying, specifying, and defining them). Here,
the court is faced with a simple statute: the government cannot interfere with religious exercise
without good reason. By focusing on the subtext of RLUIPA, that there are other liberties not
being protected by the statute, the court concludes that the statute must be promoting religion.
Deconstruction has been used to show that the presidential age requirement that the chief
executive must be thirty-five years of age could prevent a thirty-eight-year-old from becoming
president while permitting an eighteen-year-old to become president. Sinclair, supra note 110.
For a strong critique against the use of deconstruction in the field of law, see Jay P. Moran,
Postmodernism's Misguided Place in Legal Scholarship: Chaos Theory, Deconstruction and
Some Insights From Thomas Pynchon's Fiction, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 155 (1997).
153 See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
154 McConnell, supra note 66, at 175.
155 Actions, however, are still the province of government.
156 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (noting the belief that absolute truth
was knowable and useful for achieving greater societal good).
157 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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2. It Is Postmodern To Require Protectionfor All Acts of Conscience
Under the Free Exercise Clause
While presupposing the existence of God was fundamental to the Framers'
justification for the Free Exercise Clause, the Cutter court reinterpreted the free
exercise principle to protect non-religious conscientious belief because special
protection available only to religious exercise was unjustifiable in the absence of
foundational, essential truth. This Postmodern view revealed itself in the court's
effects prong analysis and is evident in the way the court frames the test. As
originally articulated, the second prong of the Lemon test requires that the
"principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion."'158 In Cutter, the court grafted on an additional factor to the effects-
endorsement test, requiring that "a particular government action benefits both
secular and religious entities." 159 The additional criterion is the result of the
158 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
159 Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264. The Sixth Circuit applied this factor due to its heavy reliance
on the Ghashiyah case. Id That court believed this standard was articulated in three Supreme
Court Establishment cases, Bd. of Ed. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Id. It is highly suspect
that these cases can be read to create such a standard. In Grumet, the issue involved a state
action that drew the boundaries for a school district along religious lines rather than using the
"customary and neutral principles" for the task, which would have led to a different result.
Grumet, 512 U.S. at 702. The Court invalidated the state action because there was reason to
believe that, because of the unique nature of the religious boundaries, defining the district civic
power would be conditional on an individual's adherence to the prevalent religion of the
community. The result was a religious test to qualify for franchise, which the Court held to
violate the Establishment Clause. Id While the Court did stress the inappropriateness of
extending benefits in a manner showing favoritism among religions, Grumet was a case of
special favoritism to a specific religion, not religion generally. In Texas Monthly, the Court
found a state sales tax exemption for religious periodicals to be unconstitutional, primarily
because the exemption was considered a subsidy from 'indirect and vicarious' donations
from the taxpayers. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14 (quoting Bob Jones University v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983)). While it is true the Court suggests that extending the tax
exemption to all non-profit groups and not just religious groups would cure the constitutional
deficiency, the problem is more sponsorship than endorsement. Id at 15-16. In Walz, the Court
rejected an Establishment Clause claim premised on the practice of granting tax exemption for
church buildings used for religious purposes, finding that the tax exemption for religious
institutions and other socially beneficial organizations neither advanced nor inhibited religion.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-73. Notably, the opinion is not expressly deemed to turn on whether
nonreligious groups are also afforded a tax exemption. While all three opinions involve state
actions toward religious entities that are clearly constitutional if also directed at non-religious
entities, they do not stand for the proposition that impermissible endorsement occurs unless
government action benefits both secular and religious entities.
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Postmodem belief that individuals construct reality and there is no reason to
elevate religion from other social creations. 160
By requiring that state action have equal benefit to secular and religious
entities, the Cutter court's decision makes any religious protection, even the Free
Exercise Clause itself, impermissible unless the state also protects secular acts of
conscience. It is possible that this is the inevitable result of the Smith decision,
which demoted religious exercise to the same unaccommodated position of other
acts of conscience. 161 The court's reasoning is flawed as it fails to comprehend
that rights and protections that are uniquely religious by definition cannot be
extended to secular entities. The Cutter court takes this to mean that religious
inmates will have superior rights to non-religious inmates. 162 This result is
intolerable to the Postmodem mind because without presupposing that God
exists, the Modem justification for distinguishing between religious belief and
other sincerely held beliefs does not hold.
The Postmodem belief that the Free Exercise Clause must be extended to
secular acts of conscience rests on its conceptions of metaphysics, the role of
government, and the ideal of rationality. The Modem view, motivated by its
belief in two-kingdoms theology, 163 created the Free Exercise Clause to exempt
an individual from civic obligation in order to fulfill obligations to God. In order
160 See supra notes 104-18 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 4-29 and accompanying text. The Smith Court's resolution that
accommodation for religion must be obtained through the legislature will become increasingly
untenable as Postmodem jurisprudence invalidates the legislation, because it prefers religion
over non-religion, creating a tautological trap for the free exercise of religion. The "trap" is
made absolute when courts assert a separation of powers argument to invalidate the
accommodation action of the legislature (which is not to say that legislative accommodations
never violate separation of power). Certainly, Cutter relies on this unwarranted reasoning. To
that court, the fact that RLUIPA gives more protection to religious exercise than was required
by the Supreme Court is a reason for invalidating it. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265. They reason that
giving more protection than the First Amendment requires is an impermissible preference
toward religious rights (not religious ideology, as though the rights themselves pose a
subversive danger). See id. at 265-66.
A brief comparison to other instances where legislatures give more protection to rights
than the Constitution requires reveals that this demonstration of bizarre territorialism by the
courts is unwarranted. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lubbock Civil Liberty Union, 680 F.2d 424
(5th Cir. 1982), held that opening school facilities to religious student groups could create the
appearance of endorsement (placing state's "imprimatur upon any faith or religious practice")
and therefore violated the Establishment Clause. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 680 F.2d at 426
(Reavley, J., dissenting). The U.S. Congress enacted the Equal Access Act prohibiting schools
from barring religious student groups from meeting on school premises. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071-
4074 (2000). The Supreme Court found that the statute did not violate the Establishment Clause
and merely extended greater speech and assembly rights than case law previously allowed. Bd.
of Ed. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,250 (1990).
162 Cutter, 349 F.3d at 266-67.
163 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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to avoid conflict between these competing obligations, the power of government
was to be limited. At the core of Postmodern thought is the rejection of
Modernity's metaphysical presuppositions, including two-kingdoms theology. 64
Since Postmodemism conceives of only a civic authority and believes that
individuals create reality, it naturally expanded the role of government, which has
led to greater tension between government and religion. The Postmodern ideal of
rationality, 165 which emerged as the rejection of faith, values forming beliefs
without the aid of tradition or what it perceives as unrealistic conceptions of
absolute truth. It follows that a Postmodern Free Exercise Clause cannot protect
religion without protecting other acts of conscientious belief as well.
V. TOWARD A WORKABLE RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE
POSTMODERN AGE
The Cutter case is representative of the serious implications of a Postmodern
Religion Clause jurisprudence. Courts are increasingly likely to adopt the
reasoning of the Cutter court as Postmodemism displaces Modernity as the
dominant American worldview, particularly when the next generation of judges
takes to the bench. While the law is expected to be somewhat evolutionary,
changing as society changes, the shift from Modernism to Postmodemism could
usher in a potentially monumental upheaval that would far exceed the
comparatively minor changes the American legal system has experienced thus
far. Such a change would affect not only the substance of the law, but also the
very foundation upon which our system is built. Nowhere would the impact of
this upheaval be felt more acutely than in the treatment of the religion clauses.
There are peculiar dangers in adopting a Postmodern Religious Clause
jurisprudence. Primarily, as should be evident at this point in the discussion,
Postmodem philosophy is intellectually divorced from the underlying purpose of
the Religion Clauses. As a result, not only will the doctrines surrounding the
Religion Clauses become even more of an incoherent and unpredictable mess, 166
the interpretation of the text will stray further away from the fair import of the
constitutional language. 167  Inherent in this problem is the fact that
Postmodemism, despite its preference for rational over traditional beliefs, is not
164 See supra notes 102-111 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
166 For criticism of the treatment of religious issues generally and the Lemon test in
particular, see Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the checkered past of the Court creating tests out of
"historically faulty doctrine") (citation omitted).
167 This line of reasoning is different from original intent arguments. The point is not that
the religion clauses are being interpreted in a manner that the Framers did not intend, although
that is possible, but rather that the interpretation is fundamentally incompatible with the
justifications for the Religion Clauses.
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religiously neutral. 168 While Modernity framed the debate concerning the legal
treatment of religion at the founding, it did so explicitly. Even though the
Postmodern view frames the debate over legal treatment today, it does so
implicitly and asserts that Modem understanding is an anathema in the realm of
public discourse. 169 This is a crucial point because Postmodemism, as applied to
the Religion Clauses, has demoted the first freedom guaranteed in the
Constitution, the fundamental right to free exercise, to an ancillary right, only
having effect if exercised with another apparently more fundamental right. As
such, vigorous debate regarding the merits and implications of these competing
world views needs to be articulated and a conscious choice between them must be
made, and any changes need to come through the constitutional process instead of
through judicial fiat.
Until a principled decision is reached to change the meaning of the First
Amendment, it is incumbent upon the courts to promote a coherent treatment of
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, which can only be achieved by
adhering to a Modem religion clause jurisprudence. I propose four guidelines that
will ensure a coherent and workable religion clause jurisprudence in the
Postmodern age.
First, in order for the promise of free exercise to be meaningful, it must be
treated as meritorious of unique protection from state interference. This would
require that Smith be reversed, or at least limited in scope. The Smith Court
overzealously championed the rule of law and lost sight of the importance of
fundamental rights. The unique vulnerability of religion is evident in the fact that
its protection has been relegated to the majoritarian process. This is not only the
opposite of what the Framers intended, 170 it is completely incompatible with the
philosophical foundations upon which the religion clauses are built. The return to
strict scrutiny or even intermediate scrutiny would not result in anarchy as the
Smith Court feared, as long as courts interpret compelling state interest through a
Modem lens, which would allow infringement on free exercise only in instances
in which infringement was absolutely necessary to promote public peace and
safety. Under the "peace and safety" rationale, the reasonable basis scrutiny of
Smith could be limited to the criminal context and then perhaps only for more
168 The shift to Postmodem ideals is "both obscured and exacerbated by the pretense that
it is merely being 'neutral' among competing conceptions of the good life. Somehow, 'neutral'
came to mean 'secular' - as if agnosticism about the theistic foundations of the universe were
common ground among believers and nonbelievers alike." McConnell, supra note 66, at 174.
169 See NEUHAUS, supra note 117, at 146-47 (noting that the slightest hint of religious
motivation behind enacting a law, even if only a personally held religious belief, could be
enough to invalidate the law completely, marginalizing rather than protecting religious
individuals in the political process).
170 See McConnell, supra note 64, at 1487-88 (noting that John Marshall and James
Madison both viewed at a minimum that the press and religion were "equally and completely
exempted" from the laws of Congress).
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serious offenses. At the core of the Modem understanding of the Religion Clauses
is the need to protect individuals from state interference or involvement in
religion simply because religion is to be beyond the province of civic sovereignty.
While it is hard to imagine the govemment shrinking back from the areas in
which interference occurs to create fewer tensions between church and state, it is
more than reasonable to assert that free religious exercise should have meaningful
legal significance (it is, after all, a fundamental right), and reversing Smith would
be the best, first step in that direction.
Second, the temptation to apply an absolute neutrality requirement in
Establishment Clause cases must be resisted, and basic separation principles
should be used in its place. By requiring absolute neutrality, courts are being co-
opted for the work of chasing any reference to religion from public life. 171 In the
event that Smith was reversed or limited, or that it was not and the legislature was
the only source from which religious exemption or accommodation could be
obtained, an Establishment Clause that demanded absolute neutrality would take
away the right to free religious exercise with the left hand after having secured it
with the right. Separation of church and state is inherently consistent with free
exercise principles. Absolute neutrality is not, as it will always favor non-religious
expression over religious expression. That is not to say that neutrality cannot be a
useful tool in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, only that it cannot be used
tyrannically. Courts using substantive or benevolent neutrality to guide the
separation principles of establishment would create a reasonable and logically
consistent Modem approach to the Religion Clauses which could all be done
within the context of the original incarnation of the Lemon test.172
Third, because of the uniquely vulnerable position of religious entities, equal
protection should be applied as between religious claimants of all different
religions. The critique, originating in Postmodem thought, that the Religion
Clauses when applied through the Modem lens favor traditional religions over
less traditional forms of religious expression can be remedied by applying equal
protection. Indeed, the Smith Court even suggested that religious exercise was
more worthy of protection if coupled with another fundamental right. 173 While
free exercise should not only be protected when exercised with another right, it
does suggest that a combined free exercise and equal protection claim should
cause a court to look with higher scrutiny upon government action that inhibits
171 "The free exercise of religion becomes the legally protected right of the dissident to
freedom from religion's exercise." NEUHAUS, supra note 117, at 147. This same critique was
leveled against the Ninth Circuit for deciding that a school's policy of voluntary recital of the
Pledge of Allegiance violated the Establishment Clause. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292
F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002).
172 For a discussion of the implications of adhering to either separation or neutrality as the
guiding Establishment Clause principles, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of
the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L. REv. 1071 (2002).
173 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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the free exercise of minority religion. By extending equal protection to religious
exercise, the law is being responsive to the impulse felt in the Postmodem age
that the religion clauses unfairly benefit Judeo-Christian religion. In application,
the state would need either a compelling or intermediate interest to infringe on
free exercise, but in cases involving minority religions, the presumption against
the governmental action would become stronger if an adherent to a majority
religion had successfully asserted a similar free exercise claim. By linking free
exercise with equal protection, vibrant protection is ensured for even minority
religious adherents.
Fourth, the temptation to extend either free exercise protection or religious
equal protection to non-religious entities must be resisted. Religious protection is
a right in America because of the Modem understanding that civic authority had
to respect the duty its citizens owed to a higher power. To be consistent with
Modem thought, all non-religiously motivated conduct is the province of the
state. As such, there is no secular equivalent to religious free exercise, and
therefore there is no justification for extending free exercise principles and
religious equal protection to secularly derived rights of conscience. This does not
implicate favoritism or discrimination. Free religious exercise is a right available
to all people; whether individuals make use of that right is not a concem of the
states. To treat individuals fairly, the state must only ensure that this right is
protected for all who would choose to exercise it. Arguably, the Free Exercise
Clause compensates the religious individual since the Establishment Clause limits
in some ways their full participation in civic life. To be a coherent system, the
Religion Clauses must not be applied to secular acts of conscience. Indeed,
following these four guidelines would ensure a Religion Clause jurisprudence that
is workable, coherent, and even compatible with the original justifications that
gave rise to the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
VI. CONCLUSION
By equalizing the sacred and the secular, Highway 61 Revisited, represents
religious understanding in the Postmodem age. The question that the American
legal system must address is whether it should get on that highway. By
understanding the effect of competing principles of Modernism and
Postmodemism on the Religion Clauses, the legal system can either more fully
protect the rights as intended, or articulate a reason that free exercise should not
be a fundamental right to the exclusion of rights of conscience. Such an important
and drastic shift should be left neither to an uncritical acceptance of the spirit of
the age, nor to a well-intentioned judiciary that ultimately limits the freedoms it
was supposed to preserve.
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